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A virtual reality paradigm as an analogue to real-life trauma: its effectiveness
compared with the trauma film paradigm
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aHealth, Medical and Neuropsychology, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands; bTriple, Alkmaar, The Netherlands; cClinical
Psychology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Background: The trauma film paradigm (TFP) is a well-established method to study the effects
of analogue psychological trauma under controlled laboratory settings. It has been used to
examine pre-, peri-, and post-trauma processes, and to create and test interventions. A possible
drawback is that watching films is a somewhat passive endeavour that lacks active behavioural
engagement. Virtual reality (VR) may provide a better alternative. Like the TFP, VR allows for
experimental control. In addition, it can induce a greater ‘feeling of presence’ and allows
interaction with the environment, enabling research on action–reaction associations.
Objective: We aimed to validate the utility of a VR paradigm as an experimental model to
study psychological trauma by comparing its effectiveness with the TFP.
Method: One group of participants (N = 25) was shown an aversive film, and another group
(N = 25) moved through a VR scene. Main outcome measures were intrusion frequency
assessed with a 7-day diary and self-rated vividness and emotionality of recalled memories
related to the film or VR scene.
Results: The results indicate that the film and VR scene were equally effective in inducing vivid
and intrusive memories. However, self-reported emotional intensity appeared to be higher for
memories related to the film than for memories related to the VR scene.
Conclusions: Perhaps the film was more effective in inducing emotional memories than the VR
scene due to its more aversive content. However, the VR scene seemed equally effective in
inducing vivid and intrusive memories, and merits further exploration in light of ethical con-
siderations (less aversive content) and other presumably beneficial qualities (e.g. inducing a
greater feeling of presence and allowing interaction with the environment).
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Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a mental dis-
order that can develop after a person is exposed to a
traumatic event. In the 5th Edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5;
American Psychiatric Association, 2013), a traumatic
event is described as exposure to actual or threatened
death, serious injury, or sexual violence. In case of
PTSD, this exposure leads to persistent re-experiencing
of the traumatic event (e.g. intrusive memories, which
are considered to be the hallmark symptom of PTSD;
James et al., 2016), persistent avoidance of stimuli
associated with the trauma, hyperarousal, and negative
alterations in cognitions and mood. In a sample of
nearly 3000 American adults, about 89.7% reported
exposure to at least one traumatic event in their life-
time, and 8.3% had developed PTSD (cf. DSM-5 cri-
teria; Kilpatrick et al., 2013).
A better understanding of the basic mechanisms
underlying trauma symptom development is important
because it provides insight into how symptoms can be
reduced. Clinical studies may be useful in this respect,
but a limitation of such studies is that they often rely on
retrospective reports of trauma-related reactions many
years later. As argued by Candel and Merckelbach
(2004), this is problematic because people in general,
and patients with PTSD in particular, find it difficult to
give accurate descriptions of past emotional states.
Moreover, reports of memory for traumatic events
often change over time (Engelhard, van den Hout, &
McNally, 2008) because individuals may interpret
memories differently over time (Engelhard &
McNally, 2015; see also Lommen, van de Schoot, &
Engelhard, 2014). Experimental analogues are therefore
warranted (James et al., 2016). The trauma film para-
digm (TFP) is a well-established alternative method
which involves showing non-clinical participants
unpleasant films. Unpleasant film viewing as an experi-
mental paradigm was introduced by Lazarus (1964),
and was then further refined to study factors related to
the development of intrusive thoughts (Horowitz, 1969)
and intrusive images (Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy,
2004) related to the film. The TFP is useful because it
offers experimental control and the trauma films typi-
cally depict the types of events listed as traumatic in the
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DSM-5 (events involving actual or threatened death,
serious injury, or sexual violence). Moreover, exposure
to trauma films elicits measurable responses analogous
to symptoms experienced during and shortly after view-
ing a traumatic event in real life (James et al., 2016),
such as increases in negative mood (Clark, Mackay, &
Holmes, 2015), and intrusive memories of the film
(Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016). The TFP
has been used to test pre-, peri-, and post-trauma pro-
cesses; e.g. mechanisms of memory formation, and
vulnerability factors. It has also been used to create
and test interventions (for an overview see Holmes &
Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016).
Dibbets and Schulte-Ostermann (2015) signalled a
possible drawback of the TFP; watching films is a
somewhat passive endeavour that lacks active beha-
vioural engagement. The participant remains an out-
sider to the film scenes. Being able to immerse in the
film’s environment should increase the participant’s
‘feeling of presence’, which is commonly described as
‘the feeling of being there’, even though you ‘know’
you are not (Wirth et al., 2007). Virtual reality (VR)
may provide a good alternative, because it can induce
a greater feeling of presence than watching a film on
a two-dimensional screen, which may lead to more
realistic (Slater, 2009) and more emotional (Riva
et al., 2007) responses to portrayed events.
Noteworthy in this respect is also a different line of
research, in which idiosyncratic autobiographical
memories of healthy participants are often used to
test the effects of dual-task interventions (van den
Hout & Engelhard, 2012). An obvious disadvantage
of this approach is that the age of the traumatic
events underlying such memories differs between
participants. This is problematic because older and
stronger memories are less likely to be modified after
reactivation than younger and weaker ones (Schwabe,
Nader, & Pruessner, 2014). Like the TFP, the VR
paradigm solves the problem of experimental control.
However, like ‘real-life’ autobiographical events, VR
allows participants to be the ‘protagonist’ and aver-
sive events to be experienced ‘directly’. Moreover, the
ability to interact may further increase the feeling of
presence (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005), and it pro-
vides new opportunities to investigate a range of
PTSD-predicting factors that cannot be investigated
using a ‘static’ film (e.g. sense of control over the
traumatic event).
Recently, Dibbets and Schulte-Ostermann (2015)
published the first study aimed at developing a fitting
VR analogue to real-life trauma, by comparing the
TFP with a VR scene with respect to changes in
negative mood and the development of intrusive
memories. The VR scene resulted in more immersion
but did not result in stronger changes in negative
mood or more intrusions. In fact, intrusion distress
was higher after watching the film than after VR. The
authors proposed that the VR scene may have been
less intense than the film. Cuperus, Laken, van den
Hout, and Engelhard (2016) argued that another
explanation may be the lack of interactive features
of the VR scene, which were limited to the ability to
determine one’s distance to the event as a passive
observer of the scene. They explored the utility of a
VR paradigm with more interactive features, in which
participants had to navigate through a virtual manor
that was designed to induce fear. The aversive events
in this environment were directed at the participants
themselves and were triggered by their actions and
decisions. Some of these events (e.g. a poltergeist
spawning nearby) are ‘implausible’, but the VR
scene induced vivid and unpleasant memories,
which suggests that it may be a useful method of
inducing negative memories. In the present study,
we aimed to further validate its use as an experimen-
tal model to study psychological trauma by compar-
ing its effects on intrusive memory development and
mood with those of the well-established TFP.
Vividness and emotionality ratings of recalled mem-
ories related to the film or VR scene were also com-
pared, and participants filled out an evaluation
questionnaire which contained statements about the
film or VR scene (e.g. I felt personally involved).
Bayesian analysis was used to evaluate our hypoth-
eses (Hoijtink, 2012; Mulder, Hoijtink, & De Leeuw,
2012). Although the aversive events in the VR scene
are likely to be considered scary and/or threatening,
they are much less aversive than those of the film we
used, which largely consists of acts of rape and physi-
cal violence. VR is probably superior in terms of feel-
ing of presence, which may compensate for the
difference in content. The first hypothesis was there-
fore that the VR scene would elicit an equal amount of
intrusions as the film. James et al. (2016) advised
researchers to use a film that is sufficiently aversive
to model trauma. Therefore, from an ethical point of
view, it may be advisable to use the VR scene instead
of highly aversive film material if both methods are
equally effective in terms of intrusion frequency.
Nevertheless, given that many studies have found
that TFP is effective (Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James
et al., 2016) and that the VR paradigm is relatively
novel, the second hypothesis was that the film would
elicit more intrusive memories. Finally, because the
qualities of VR may overcompensate the less aversive
content, we also tested the contrasting third hypothesis
that the VR scene would elicit more intrusive mem-
ories. Following the same rationale, we tested the same
three hypotheses with respect to vividness and emo-
tionality of the negative memories induced by both
paradigms. We expected pre- to post-film/VR mood
changes and the ratings of the four statements of the
evaluation questionnaire to follow the pattern to be
observed for intrusion frequency.
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1. Method
1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited via the website ‘proef-
bunny.nl’, and a Facebook recruitment page for
experiments at Utrecht University (‘Universiteit
Utrecht Betaalde Experimenten’). To be eligible, par-
ticipants had to be at least 18 years old. Individuals
with a medical history of heart disease or epilepsy, or
with psychiatric problems, were excluded. Fifty parti-
cipants were assigned randomly, but with gender
ratio controlled for, to the film condition (nine
males, 16 females) or the VR condition (eight males,
17 females). Most of them were students at Utrecht
University. They participated in exchange for remu-
neration or course credits. Their mean age was
22.2 years (range 19–31; SD = 3.0); 22.6 years in the
film condition (SD = 3.5), and 21.7 years (SD = 2.4)
in the VR condition.
1.2. Ethical considerations
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of
the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences of
Utrecht University (FETC16-013). We adopted the
safety strategies from the study of Cuperus et al.
(2016). In the present study, however, participants
were not informed about the nature of the VR scene
and the film in the acquisition text, because we did
not want to exclusively attract fans of the horror
genre. Instead, prior to the day of the experiment,
they were sent the information letter which contained




The 22 items from the neuroticism scale of the
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1975) were used to assess neuroticism. Items
were rated ‘yes’ or ‘no’, which translates to scores of 1
or 0, or vice versa, depending on the question. Higher
scores indicate greater neuroticism. For the present
study Cronbach’s α was .78.
1.3.2. State and trait anxiety
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger,
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) was used to assess anxi-
ety. The test is split into the S-Anxiety scale and the
T-Anxiety scale, measuring state anxiety (Cronbach’s
α = .89) and trait anxiety (Cronbach’s α = .88) respec-
tively, and each having 20 items. Items of both scales
were rated on 4-point scales that ranged from 1 (not
at all/almost never) to 4 (extremely/almost always).
Higher scores indicate greater anxiety.
1.3.3. Mood
Ratings of mood (happy, anxious, depressed, and
angry) were given before and after the film or VR
scene, on four 100 mm visual analogue scales (VAS)
that ranged from 0 (not X at all) to 100 (extremely X;
cf. Davies & Clark, 1998).1
1.3.4. Memory vividness and emotionality
Participants were asked to recall the moment from
the film or VR scene that they considered most
unpleasant. They were instructed to visualize this
moment and keep an image of it in mind for 10 s,
and then rate its vividness and emotionality on two
100 mm VAS that ranged from 0 (not vivid/unplea-
sant) at all to 100 (extremely vivid/unpleasant; cf.
Engelhard, van den Hout, & Smeets, 2011).2
1.3.5. Evaluation questionnaire
This questionnaire contained four statements about
the film or VR scene: (1) I felt personally involved, (2)
The events were unpredictable, (3) What happened
somehow seemed real, and (4) I was startled by what
happened. Participants rated these statements on four
100 mm VAS that ranged from 0 (not X at all) to 100
(extremely X).
1.3.6. Intrusions
Intrusive memories were recorded in a tabular
paper-and-pencil intrusion diary for seven days
after watching the film/VR (Holmes et al., 2004).
Participants noted each intrusion’s content and
rated whether it was an image, a thought, or a
combination of both. For the present study, intru-
sions are defined as unintended, spontaneously
occurring memories that at least contain an image,
so mere thoughts were excluded.
1.3.7. Diary compliance
Participants rated the statement I was often unable (or
often forgot) to report my intrusions in the diary on an
11-point scale that ranged from 0 (totally untrue) to
10 (totally true).
1.4. Procedure
After reading the information sheet, participants
signed the consent form. They were then shown a
neutral film, which was a 1:51 min scene from the
movie ‘Coach Carter’ (Gale, Robbins, Tollin, &
Carter, 2005), after which they filled out the EPQ
and the STAI, and rated their mood. Depending on
random assignment, participants were then shown
the trauma film or VR scene.
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1.5. Film condition
The trauma film consisted of four scenes depicting
acts of violence and rape from the movie ‘Irréversible’
(Chioua, Cassel, & Noé, 2002), lasting 6:50 min in
total (1 × 140 s, 3 × 90 s; cf. Henckens, Hermans, Pu,
Joëls, & Fernández, 2009). Clips from this movie
induced intrusive memories in several studies (e.g.
Schaich, Watkins, & Ehring, 2013; Verwoerd, De
Jong, & Wessel, 2008). Furthermore, a variety of
physiological measures (cortisol level, heart rate, and
pupil dilation) confirmed successful stress induction
for these particular four scenes (Henckens et al.,
2009), and a longer version of the rape scene elicited
a higher heart rate, more distress, and more intrusive
memories than three other trauma films (Weidmann,
Conradi, Gröger, Fehm, & Fydrich, 2009).
Participants were instructed to immerse completely
into the depicted film scenes, after which the experi-
menter turned off the light and left the room (cf.
Dibbets & Schulte-Ostermann, 2015). The film scenes
were projected on a 16.93 × 11.49-inch screen and
audio was provided through a headphone (Sennheiser
HD 449). Participants started the film by pressing the
space bar and were asked to notify the experimenter
when it was finished.
1.6. VR condition
The VR scene was a modified version of ‘Affected’
version 1.55, developed by Fallen Planet Studios (fall-
enplanetstudios.com), made to fit the needs of the
present study. Unlike in the original version as used
by Cuperus et al. (2016), in this modified version
participants started in the ‘Manor’ stage instead of
another room where the stage had to be selected first.
Furthermore, it contained no random events and
only allowed for one route in the manor, so we
could be sure that all participants were exposed to
the same events.
The environment of the manor is generally scary
and contains several jump scares, such as a slamming
door, a cabinet falling over, and a poltergeist that
spawns nearby. The goal was to reach the other end
of the manor by crossing each section and jump scare
once. Participants were instructed to notify the
experimenter when the end was reached. They were
also informed that the experimenter would leave the
room after the VR scene was started. To prevent that
duration of exposure to VR would exceed the length
of the trauma film, the experimenter re-entered the
room and turned it off after 6:50 min (film duration)
if it was not yet finished by then.
Participants moved through the virtual environ-
ment using a Microsoft Xbox 360 controller. The
visuals were provided through a head-mounted display
(Oculus Rift Development Kit 2), and audio was pro-
vided through a headphone (Sennheiser SD 449).
After the film or VR scene, participants rated the
mood scale again. We then used a distractor task to
remove film- or VR-related visuals fromworking mem-
ory. It was a paper-and-pencil Sudoku puzzle, taken
from an online database and ranked level ‘easy’ (cf.
Tadmor, McNally, & Engelhard, 2016). Participants
were asked to complete as much of the puzzle as possi-
ble within 90 s. Afterwards, they recalled the moment
from the film or VR scene that they considered most
unpleasant and rated the vividness and emotionality of
this memory. Finally, they filled out the evaluation
questionnaire and were given the intrusion diary. The
experimenter guided them through the written instruc-
tions that were included with the diary to make sure
that these were clear to them.
Participants returned to the laboratory one week
later to hand over the diary and discuss the reported
intrusions with the experimenter. They also rated diary
compliance, after which they were debriefed and offered
a short mindfulness session of approximately 5 min.
1.7. Data analyses
Before analysing the data, an analysis plan was formu-
lated. Because neuroticism is related to PTSD symp-
toms (e.g. Engelhard, van den Hout, & Lommen, 2009;
van den Hout & Engelhard, 2004), it was included as a
covariate in the analyses. As a result, the hypotheses
concern the conditional means. The anxiety variables
were added as descriptive statistics.
We formulated our expectations regarding the
three key variables, intrusion frequency, memory
vividness, and memory emotionality, in hypotheses:
H1: µfilm = µVR
H2: µfilm > µVR
H3: µfilm < µVR
The first hypothesis states that the two conditions
have equalmeans on the variable of interest. The second
hypothesis specifies that the mean of the relevant vari-
able in the film condition is higher than the mean in the
VR condition. The third hypothesis states that the mean
in the film condition is lower than in the VR condition.
Together, H1, H2, and H3 form all possibilities of
equality and inequality between the two means.
A frequentist analysis cannot quantify the relative
evidence for a set of null (H1) and inequality constrained
(H2 and H3) hypotheses (Wagenmakers, 2007). This is
possible using Bayes factors and posterior probabilities.
The Bayes factor BF12 expresses the support for H1
relative to H2. For example, if BF12 = 1, both hypotheses
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are equally supported by the data, if BF12 = 3, H1 is three
times more supported by the data than H2, and if
BF12 = .25, H2 is four times more supported than H1.
Some guidelines for interpretation have been proposed
by Kass and Raftery (1995), suggesting that a Bayes factor
of 3 (or .33) indicates ‘substantial evidence’, and a Bayes
factor of 10 (or .10) indicates ‘strong evidence’. However,
we like to emphasize that these are merely guidelines and
that, for instance, Bayes factors of 2.8 or 3.1 express
rather similar evidence.
The Bayes factors can be used to update prior
probabilities of the hypotheses into posterior prob-
abilities that can be used to easily evaluate the relative
support for more than two hypotheses given the
observed data (Hoijtink, 2012, p. 53). In the present
study, we assumed that a priori each of the hypoth-
eses is equally likely, that is, the prior probabilities are
equal for each hypothesis considered.
Bayes factors were computed in BIEMS (Mulder et al.,
2012). In order to compute a Bayes factor, a prior dis-
tribution for the parameters of the statistical model needs
to be specified under each hypothesis. BIEMS computes
a suitable (conjugate) prior distribution using a minimal
training sample from the data (Mulder et al., 2012). Thus,
the prior distribution is based on the data and does not
incorporate additional prior information. This results in
a so-called default Bayes factor.
Eight variables (the mood and questionnaire vari-
ables) were selected for further exploratory analyses.
In these analyses, the same set of hypotheses was
considered as in the analyses of the key variables
(H1, H2, and H3).
For intrusion frequency, one score deviated more
than three standard deviations from the mean. Before
analysing the data, this score was changed to one unit
larger than the next most extreme score in the dis-
tribution (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
2. Results
2.1. Baseline variables
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for
the baseline variables, key variables, and exploratory
variables. Both state and trait anxiety were comparable
between the two randomised groups. However, we
found that despite random assignment the VR group,
on average, scored higher on neuroticism.
2.2. Main analyses
Table 2 depicts the Bayes factors and posterior prob-
abilities for H1, H2, and H3 for each of the key
variables. The preferred hypothesis differs per vari-
able of interest. With respect to intrusion frequency,
the best hypothesis is H1, which states that the VR
scene would elicit an equal amount of intrusions as
the film. With respect to memory vividness it seems
that, although H1 has more than half of the posterior
probability, H2 also has substantial probability and
cannot be easily ruled out. Thus, either memory
vividness was equal for both conditions or it was
higher for the film condition. However, for memory
emotionality the best hypothesis is H2, which states
that memory emotionality would be higher in the
film condition than in the VR condition.3
2.3. Exploratory analyses
Table 3 presents the Bayes factors and posterior
probabilities for H1, H2, and H3 for all exploratory
variables. It shows that there is no clear trend over
the variables. For the mood variables, it seems most
likely that participants in the film condition had a
larger increase in anger than in the VR condition (H2
was supported the most). The increase in anxiety was
most likely larger in the VR condition than in the
film condition (H3 was supported the most). For the
Table 1. Mean scores (SD) for the baseline variables, key
variables, and exploratory variables.
Variable Film VR
Baseline variables
Neuroticism 4.56 (3.07) 6.80 (4.37)
State anxiety 34.68 (8.29) 35.24 (7.33)
Trait anxiety 33.12 (8.94) 32.44 (5.41)
Key variables
Intrusion frequency 3.60 (3.83) 3.48 (3.97)
Memory vividness 67.60 (18.20) 62.72 (22.93)
Memory emotionality 69.48 (21.55) 51.08 (25.40)
Exploratory variables
Happy (post – pre) −13.92 (18.38) −17.48 (12.07)
Anxious (post – pre) 11.24 (19.65) 28.80 (21.01)
Depressed (post – pre) 12.36 (16.91) 11.20 (17.84)
Angry (post – pre) 17.12 (19.46) 2.48 (12.37)
Personal involvement 45.84 (31.39) 63.52 (18.87)
Unpredictability 38.40 (23.18) 55.08 (19.24)
Realism 55.52 (26.91) 60.52 (19.06)
Startle 63.08 (24.62) 72.00 (20.12)
Table 2. Bayes factors and posterior probabilities for key
variables; H1, H2, and H3 (controlling for neuroticism; EPQ).
Variable BF12 BF13 BF23 PP H1 PP H2 PP H3
Intrusion frequency 3.58 5.32 1.48 .681 .190 .128
Memory vividness 1.63 8.36 5.13 .577 .354 .069
Memory emotionality .06 6.22 102.33 .056 .921 .009
Table 3. Bayes factors and posterior probabilities for explora-
tory variables; H1, H2, and H3 (controlling for neuroticism;
EPQ).
Variable BF12 BF13 BF23 PP H1 PP H2 PP H3
Happya 1.14 3.72 3.26 .467 .408 .125
Anxious 10.00 .05 <.01 .048 .005 .948
Depressed 2.18 2.46 1.13 .536 .246 .218
Angry .04 8.00 199.00 .038 .957 .005
Personal involvement 6.57 .24 .04 .186 .028 .785
Unpredictability 15.00 .08 .01 .070 .005 .925
Realism 3.35 1.53 .46 .512 .153 .335
Startle 5.00 .59 .12 .347 .069 .584
aHigher scores indicate less reduction of happiness ratings.
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variables ‘happy’ and ‘depressed’ it appears that we
cannot easily choose the best hypothesis.
In the second set of exploratory variables, we found
that for ‘personal involvement’ and ‘unpredictability’,
both H1 and H2 are unlikely hypotheses relative to
H3, indicating that it is most likely that the VR scene
was more personally involving and unpredictable than
the film. Additionally, for the variables ‘realism’ and
‘startle’, H1 and H3 have more weight than H2, but it
is not clear which hypothesis is most supported. Thus,
it is inconclusive whether the film and VR scene were
equally realistic and startling (H1) or whether VR was
more realistic and startling (H3).4
3. Discussion
The TFP is a well-established method to study the
effects of analogue psychological trauma under con-
trolled laboratory settings (for an overview see
Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016).
However, because watching films is a somewhat pas-
sive endeavour that lacks active behavioural engage-
ment, VR may provide a better alternative (Dibbets &
Schulte-Ostermann, 2015). In the present study, we
aimed to further validate the VR paradigm used by
Cuperus et al. (2016) as an experimental model to
study psychological trauma by comparing its effec-
tiveness with the TFP.
The results indicate that the film and VR scene were
equally effective in inducing vivid and intrusive mem-
ories. This is noteworthy because we used a highly aver-
sive film (‘Irréversible’), depicting physical and sexual
violence, and a game-like VR scene (‘Affected’; Cuperus
et al., 2016). As argued by James et al. (2016), in selecting
a film, it is not necessarily the aim to find the most
aversive film that an ethical committee will allow. They
advised researchers to aim to find a film that is suffi-
ciently aversive to model trauma. From an ethical point
of view, it may be advisable to use theVR scene instead of
the clips from ‘Irréversible’ to generate intrusive and
vivid memories. This way, participants do not have to
be exposed to highly aversive film material. However,
watching the film did result in memories of higher emo-
tional valence. In light of ethical considerations and the
presumably beneficial qualities of VR (e.g. inducing a
greater feeling of presence and allowing interaction with
the environment), using the VR scene could be prefer-
able and at least is worth further exploration.
With respect to the exploratory variables, the results
weremixed. Participants in the film condition seemed to
show a greater increase in anger than participants in the
VR condition, which is likely the result of the morally
objectionable content in the film. However, it appears
that participants in the VR condition showed a greater
increase in anxiety, whichmay be caused by the fact that
the VR scene was specifically designed to induce fear.
Another possibility may be that the film elicited a wider
variety in emotional responses; anxiety and anger, but
also horror and disgust (Hagenaars, Brewin, Van
Minnen, Holmes, & Hoogduin, 2010), whereas the VR
scene was specifically adequate in eliciting anxiety.
The results also indicated that the VR scene was
considered more personally involving and unpredict-
able. Speculatively, the VR scene was considered more
involving because it contained events that were directed
at participants themselves. The higher unpredictability
ratings in the VR condition may be caused by jump
scares that are designed to be unpredictable. Note that
intrusion frequency for VR and film seemed similar
despite these differences, which may suggest that per-
sonal involvement and unpredictability are not relevant
for intrusion development. However, theoretical mod-
els assume otherwise (e.g. Foa, Zinbarg, & Rothbaum,
1992). The influence of these factors is therefore more
likely outweighed by the highly aversive content of the
film compared to the VR content. For the remaining
exploratory variables, the data appears insufficient to
express a preference for a certain hypothesis.
One could argue that it is worth exploring more
complex and/or aversive VR scenes although, from an
ethical point of view, we can consider it a strength of
our VR scene that it was not extremely aversive; that is,
it may be aversive enough to study the development of
intrusive, vivid, unpleasant memories. A direction for
future research is to replicate this study with groups that
have similar neuroticism scores. It would also be inter-
esting to compare the VR scene with a two-dimensional
version of the same scene. This would provide some
insight into the link between feeling of presence and
PTSD symptoms, and into how far the presumed
greater feeling of presence is accountable for the results
of the present study, as opposed to the difference in
content. Alternatively, a feeling of presence measure
such as the ITC-Sense of Presence Inventory (Lessiter,
Freeman, Keogh, & Davidoff, 2001) could be integrated
in the design of the present study.
Highlights of the article
● Healthy participants watched an aversive film or
moved through a VR scene
● Main outcome measures were intrusion fre-
quency over a 7-day period, and self-rated vivid-
ness and emotionality of recalled memories
related to the film or VR scene
● Film and VR were equally effective in inducing
intrusive memories
● Memories of the film and VR scene were equally
vivid, but film-related memories were more
emotional
● The VR scene merits further exploration con-
sidering ethical considerations and additional
possibilities
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Notes
1. We intended to measure the effect of the film/VR
scene on state dissociation as well, using the
Dissociative State Subscale. However, we only included
a post-test and decided not to report the data because
of this methodological flaw.
2. For purely exploratory purposes, we also measured
heart rate during another 1-min version of this
recall task. Also, a 1-min baseline heart rate mea-
surement was established before the film/VR scene,
so that the effect of recall on heart rate could be
derived from difference scores. However, due to
interpretation difficulties we decided not to report
these data.
3. The analyses were also executed without neuroticism
as a covariate, because the small sample can cause bias
in the conditional means. The results were similar,
with the exception that none of the hypotheses were
clearly preferred for intrusion frequency.
4. The exploratory analyses were also executed without
neuroticism as a covariate, because the small sample
can cause bias in the conditional means. The results
were similar.
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